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NOW v. SCHEIDLER: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT FALLS VICTIM TO RICO
INTRODUCTION
The right to abortion is perhaps the most controversial issue to
confront this nation since slavery. This ideological schism, coupled
with the fervor often accompanying an issue viewed in terms of moral
absolutes, has resulted in increasingly violent confrontations between
the pro-life and pro-choice camps. One recent forty-two state survey
found that, of the 281 clinics nationwide which perform abortions,
over half have suffered violent attacks, threats or blockades.' While
serious, these acts pale in comparison to the recent support for, and in
at least two instances resort to, murder by members of various radical
fringe elements of the pro-life movement.2
This escalating level of animosity has shocked the American
psyche and forced the nation's courts to rethink the traditional doc-
trines governing freedom of expression. While abortion providers
have enjoyed limited success in deterring clinic protests in certain in-
stances,3 the Supreme Court's recent ruling in National Organization
1. Ana Puga, Half of Abortion Clinics in Survey Report Hostile Acts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
5, 1993, at 6.
2. Clinic Doctor Fatally Shot During Anti-Abortion Protest, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 11, 1993,
at All (reporting on the murder of Dr. David Gunn, a physician who performed abortion proce-
dures in Pensacola, Fla. in March 1993); Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor Wounded, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1993, at A12 (reporting on the shooting of Dr. George Tiller, a physician who per-
formed abortion procedures in Wichita, Kansas in August 1993); Abortion Doctor Killed at
Clinic, TULSA WORLD, July 30, 1994, at Al (reporting on the murders of Dr. John Britton, a
physician who performed abortion procedures, and his escort, James Barrett, in Pensacola, Fla.
in July 1994).
3. Abortion providers have successfully prosecuted civil suits against antiabortion demon-
strators under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982) (originally enacted as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871)
(prohibiting individuals from conspiring to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws"). The usual remedy granted to abortion providers is an injunction bar-
ring demonstrators from obstructing access to the clinic. See Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F.
Supp. 577, 587-90 (E.D. Pa. 1989), modified, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); New York State NOW
v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1353-54 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Lissa Shults Campbell, Comment, A
Critical Analysis of Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic and the Use of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)
to Protect a Woman's Right to an Abortion, 41 KAN. L. REv. 569 (1993); David A. Gardey, Note,
Federal Power to the Rescue: The Use of 1985(3) Against Anti-Abortion Protestors, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 707 (1992). But see National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp.
1168, 1171-72 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
Abortion providers have also attempted to bring claims against demonstrators under 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (the Sherman Act). The usual theory advanced in support of such a claim is
1
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for Women v. Scheidler4 has furnished these clinics with an unprece-
dented weapon: the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (the RICO).5
It is the author's contention that Congress neither anticipated nor
intended RICO to be used in this manner.6 The Act, as enacted by
Congress, is an extremely powerful legal tool to be employed only
where criminal actors are motivated by economic concerns. A resort
to RICO where legitimate political protest is involved, in the form of
antiabortion picketing, will inevitably chill free speech and interfere
with the most fundamental of constitutional rights.
Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court's ruling in
Scheidler and the reasons advanced for allowing RICO's use against
antiabortion protestors. Part II examines the Act itself, including ac-
companying legislative history, to divine congressional intent as to its
proper application. Part III discusses the inevitable adverse effect
RICO will have on First Amendment freedoms under Scheidler.
that the defendants have conspired to destroy non-tangible property interests belonging to the
clinic, i.e., its abortion procedure business, thereby acting in restraint of trade. The courts have
responded by stating that the clinic must prove an anti-competitive effect on the provision of
abortion services within the clinic's market area. Specifically, there must exist an impact on in-
terstate commerce. Injury to the clinic's own business is insufficient. See Northeast Women's
Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300, 1303-05 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961). But see Dinah R. PoKempner, Note, The
Scope of Noerr Immunity for Direct Action Protestors: Antitrust Meets the Anti-Abortionists, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 662, 671 (1989).
4. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
RICO has become the weapon of choice for litigants whenever possible. A suit brought
under RICO provides a plaintiff with several advantages. First, a plaintiff may bring an action
under civil RICO without the requirement of a criminal indictment. Antonio J. Califa, RICO
Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805,814 (1990); See also CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T.
OF JUSTICE, CIVIL Rico: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 16 (1988). Second, a claim
need only be supported by a "preponderance of the evidence." Califa, supra, at 814. Such a
burden of proof is less demanding than that imposed by the "clear and convincing" standard or
the usual criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id Third, and most important, a
successful plaintiff may recover treble damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
6. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985) [hereinafter REPORT OF Tm AD Hoc
CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE]. But see John H. Henn & Maria Del Monaco, Civil Rights and RICO:
Stopping Operation Rescue, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 251 (1990) (arguing that RICO properly
lends itself to civil prosecution of pro-life demonstrators).
[Vol. 30:195
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I. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN V. SCHEIDLER
A. Proceedings Below
In October 1986, the National Organization for Women, together
with two women's health care centers involved in performing abor-
tions, brought an action in the District Court of the Northern District
of Illinois seeking federal relief from what they claimed was a nation-
wide campaign by defendants to close medical clinics which provided
abortion services.7 The defendants named in the suit were a coalition
of antiabortion groups known as the Pro-Life Action Network (the
PLAN) which included, among others, Joseph Scheidler, a leading an-
tiabortion activist, and Operation Rescue.s
The plaintiffs alleged that various activities engaged in by PLAN,
including extortion, physical and verbal intimidation of clinic staff and
patients, trespass upon and damage to clinic property, and destruction
7. NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). In the Illinois District Court action, plaintiffs amended their
original complaint and included allegations of violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988), and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). Id
The District Court ruled against plaintiffs as to the portion of their claim based upon the
Sherman Act, holding that defendants' antiabortion activity was not motivated by financial or
commercial concerns but was a political activity designed to influence governmental action.
Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 939-41. Such activity was held not to fall within the ambit of the Act,
which, according to prior judicial decisions and legislative history, was enacted to regulate anti-
competitive conduct with financial, economic or commercial objectives. Id at 939-40. See East-
ern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that efforts to
restrain or monopolize trade in order to influence government action are protected from anti-
trust liability). The District Court's ruling as to the portion of the complaint based upon the
Sherman Act was affirmed on appeal by the Seventh Circuit. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612,
617-23 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
8. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 939. PLAN members involved themselves in other activities
designed to undermine the operating ability of abortion clinics and the pro-choice movement in
general. Members engaged in telephone campaigns in an effort to overload clinic phone lines,
scheduled false appointments to prevent legitimate patients from obtaining clinic services,
threatened to disrupt and harass those businesses which provided goods and services to clinics,
and intimidated landlords involved in leasing property to clinics. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 615-16.
Scheidler himself had previously been convicted for criminal trespass and harassment. Id. at
615. He authored and distributes a manual entitled Closed. 99 Ways to Stop Abortion, advocat-
ing illegal methods of interfering with and preventing the operation of clinics providing abortion
services. Scheidler testified before Congress that "[W]hen the laws allow the killing of innocent
human beings, we will change those laws. And until we change those laws, we will find ways to
get around them." Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. & 2d Sess.
61, 66 (1987).
Operation Rescue is a militant pro-life organization founded by Randall Terry. See gener-
ally Larry Martz et al., The New Pro-Life Offensive, NEWswaEK, Sept. 12, 1988, at 25; Julian
Bond, Dr. King's Unwelcome Heirs, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 2, 1988, at A27; Charles E. Rice, Issues
Raised by the Abortion Rescue Movement, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 15 (1989) (providing a de-
tailed treatment of various legal and philosophical questions brought about by the abortion res-
cue movement and an analysis of Operation Rescue, its goals and tactics).
1994]
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of center advertising, constituted a pattern of racketeering and illegal
activity9 in violation of RICO. 10 Specifically, section 1962(a), (c) and
(d) were implicated." Subsection (a) prohibits establishing, acquiring,
operating or investing in an "enterprise" with "income derived ...
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an un-
lawful debt." 2 Subsection (c) forbids "any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise... to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."13 Subsection
(d) renders illegal a conspiracy to violate any of the above
provisions.' 4
At trial, the District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. 5 The court acknowledged that, although
the defendants' actions may have constituted extortion as alleged
(thereby becoming a "pattern of racketeering activity" for section
1962 purposes), there was no income generated from such activity as
required by subsection (a). 6 Any income produced resulted solely
from contributions by persons sympathetic to the defendants' cause,
i.e. supporters.' 7 Thus, the conduct complained of did not fall within
the purview of subsection (a).'8
That portion of the plaintiffs' claim based upon subsection (c)
prompted closer examination by the District Court. It was noted that
the circuits which had addressed similar RICO claims were in conflict
as to whether the predicate acts of racketeering or the enterprise19
9. To state a RICO claim, a plaintiff must establish a "pattern of racketeering activity"
involving the commission of, or conspiracy to commit, at least two predicate acts within a ten-
year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). For a list of those activities which serve as "predicate
acts," see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
10. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 938.
11. Id. at 941, 944.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
15. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 945.
16. Id. at 941.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988) (defining "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity").
[Vol. 30:195
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itself must be economically motivated.2' The Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits held that this was indeed the case,2 1 while the Third Circuit re-
fused to impose an economic motive requirement.'
The District Court considered the approach taken by the Second
Circuit as the better reasoned of the two views and held that, in order
to properly state a RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege that a defend-
ant's actions were in furtherance of some profit-generating goal.2
3
Although plaintiffs alleged that defendants' actions were designed to
force abortion clinics out of business, the court concluded there was
no true economic motive behind such conduct.24 Rather, closing
health centers which provided abortion services was a means toward a
political end, not an income-generating act in and of itself. 2 Because
the court found nothing to sustain those portions of plaintiffs' claim
based upon subsections (a) and (c), the subsection (d) component, re-
quiring a conspiracy to violate section 1962, was also dismissed.
V 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's dis-
missal of the plaintiffs' claim.2 7 Though the appellate court conceded
that it was common judicial practice to liberally construe RICO, it
adhered to the District Court's reasoning in holding that an economic
motive was required in order to bring a defendant within reach of the
statute. 8 In its evaluation of plaintiffs' section 1962(c) claim,29 the
court, relying upon the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in
United States v. Ivic, ° found support for an economic motive require-
ment in the Justice Department's RICO Guidelines which stated that
20. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 942.
21. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that Croatian nationalist
bombings were designed to eliminate political opponents, not obtain money, and thus not ad-
dressable under RICO); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.) (citing United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)) (find-
ing that defendants' attempts to control St. Louis labor unions were designed to enhance fi-
nances, thereby satisfying the economic motive requirement of RICO), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974
(1988). See also United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1032 (1985); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42,55 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
22. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350 (3d Cir.) (holding
that since the Hobbs Act, a RICO predicate offense, required no economic motive, it was not
necessary for plaintiff's claim to allege that defendants' conduct was economically motivated),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
23. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 943.
24. Id. at 944.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 631 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
28. Id. at 629.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (prohibiting the conduct or participation in the affairs of an
enterprise through racketeering).
30. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
1994]
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no indictment of an association was to issue unless that entity existed
for the purpose of achieving an economic goal.3 '
The Court of Appeals further bolstered its ruling by noting that
the Ivic court interpreted the term "enterprise" in section 1962 (a) and
(b) as an "organized profit-seeking venture."'32 The Ivic court deter-
mined that there was no indication Congress intended that term to
have a different meaning in subsection (c). 33 Finally, the Court of Ap-
peals pointed out that the Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Im-
rex Co.,34 held "[we should not lightly infer that Congress intended
[terms] to have wholly different meanings in neighboring
subsections. 35
B. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, noting the conflict among the circuits as to
RICO's requirement of an economic motive,36 granted plaintiffs' peti-
tion for certiorari.37 In addressing the portion of plaintiffs' claim
predicated upon section 1962(c), the Court first looked to the opera-
tive language of the provision to determine whether an economic mo-
tive was in fact mandated.38 It stated that no such requirement was
facially indicated.3 9 The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding
section 1961(1) 4  and (4)41, the relevant RICO definitional
provisions.42
The Court determined that the Seventh Circuit's reliance upon
the meaning of the term "enterprise" in subsections (a) and (b) (as a
means of ascertaining how that term should be interpreted in subsec-
tion (c)) was misplaced.43 In prohibiting the use of income gained
through racketeering to acquire an interest in, establish or operate an
31. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 628.
32. ld. at 627 (relying upon Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60).
33. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60.
34. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
35. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 627 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 489).
36. Compare Ivic, 700 F.2d at 59-65 and United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th
Cir.) (holding that RICO requires an enterprise to be directed toward an economic goal), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988) with Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342,
1350 (3d Cir.) (finding that no economic motive is required under RICO since the predicate act
requires no economic motive), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
37. NOW v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993).
38. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803-04 (1994).
39. hI
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See supra note 9.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). See supra note 19.
42. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 803-04.
43. Id. at 804.
[Vol. 30:195
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enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, the "enter-
prise" referred to in subsection (a) was construed as something to be
procured; a "victim" of the racketeering activity.4 The term was
given a similar construct within the context of subsection (b).45
However, in evaluating subsection (c), the Court concluded that
the "enterprise" mentioned therein was not an acquisition resulting
from illegal activity but, rather, the "vehicle" through which such ac-
tivity was carried out.4 6 Thus, because subsection (c), unlike subsec-
tions (a) and (b), prohibits an individual employed by or associated
with an enterprise from taking part in the affairs of that enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering," it does not require that the enter-
prise possess a property interest.47 Since the enterprise is not one be-
ing acquired, the Court held there need be no economic motive for
participation in its affairs through racketeering.'
The Court, citing its decision in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,4 9 addressed the appellate court's reliance upon the
Second Circuit ruling in United States v. Bagarics° which held that
Congress, through its statement of findings prefacing RICO, sought to
condemn illicit activity which required an economic motive.51 The
Court pointed out that the predicate acts upon which the plaintiffs'
RICO claim was based, such as the alleged extortion, while not bene-
fitting the defendants financially, were nevertheless acts which had the
potential to "drain money from the economy by harming businesses
such as the clinics."52 Thus, the Supreme Court held that Congress
did not intend to limit the application of RICO to acts undertaken
with a profit-seeking motive.53
Though the Court of Appeals concluded that the Justice Depart-
ment's RICO Guidelines were entitled to deference, inasmuch as they
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that "[o]ne commentator uses the terms 'prize,'
'instrument,' 'victim,' and 'perpetrator' to describe the four separate roles the enterprise may
play in section 1962." Id. at 804 n.5 (referring to G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 237,307-25 (1982)).
47. Id. at 804.
48. Id.
49. 492 U.S. 229,248 (1989).
50. 706 F.2d 42, 57 n.13 (2d Cir.) (noting reliance upon congressional findings, which state
that the purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act is to reach the activities of groups that
"drain billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud, and corruption"), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
51. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
52. Id.
53. Id
1994]
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required the existence of an economic motive before indictment of an
entity as an "enterprise," the Supreme Court thought this emphasis
misguided.5 4 It pointed to the fact that the Justice Department
amended its guidelines in 1984 to provide that an enterprise be "di-
rected toward an economic or other identifiable goal."' ' The Court
cited this as further support for its position that RICO required no
economic motive of a defendant.5 6
II. RICO AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The Organized Crime Control Act (the OCCA), Title IX of
which is RICO, became law on October 15, 1970.57 The primary pur-
pose of the Act was to address those unique problems presented by
organized crime. 8 Specifically, the Kefauver Committee, 9 the first
among many national committees to address the issue prior to enact-
ment of the OCCA, reported that criminal syndicates were undermin-
ing the nation's economy through their acquisition of legitimate
businesses using funds generated by illegal activity. 0 This involve-
ment in American enterprise was claimed to "harm innocent investors
and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, [and]
seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce. ' ' 61
Due to the tendency of organized crime operations to "legiti-
mate" criminal revenue by investing in legal businesses, the crime
fighting methods traditionally used against this element were quickly
becoming antiquated, and therefore, a more sophisticated approach
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) [hereinafter
OCCA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
58. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249, 256 (1982).
59. See S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951).
60. See Blakey, supra note 58, at 249. See also G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies,
53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL AC" OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
The Senate Report stated:
Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corrup-
tion: ... (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legiti-
mate business and labor unions... ; (4) organized crime activities in the United States
weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system ....
Id.
61. See Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. Rev. 805,809 (1990)
(alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 617, supra note 60, at 1).
[Vol. 30:195
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was needed.62 As money was seen as the driving force behind these
operations, it was believed that the manner in which to destroy organ-
ized crime was to attack its economic base.63 This tactic was the pur-
pose for which RICO, with its disproportionate penalty, forfeiture and
pre-trial seizure provisions,' was designed. 65
Statements made while under consideration by the House Judici-
ary Committee suggest that, in targeting organized crime, RICO was
to focus on revenue-generating criminal activity. For example, Sena-
tor John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Criminal'Law and Procedures
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee and author of the
bill, appearing as a witness before the Judiciary Committee, testified
that RICO was designed to prevent organized crime from infiltrating
legitimate businesses using criminal proceeds.66 Similarly, the House
sponsor of the bill, Representative Richard H. Poff, asserted that the
purpose for which criminal syndicates engaged in illicit activity was
that of pecuniary gain.67
As evidenced by the statute's Statement of Findings, 68 congres-
sional focus upon damage to American enterprise by criminal syndi-
cates utilizing ill-gotten gains serves as a clear indicator that economic
motivation was intended to play an important role in determining a
defendant's culpability under RICO.69 Further, such a requirement is
implicit in the language of section 1961(1),70 RICO's definitional sec-
tion.71 That section refers to crimes which embrace an economic mo-
tive, such as gambling, or to those which promote schemes inclusive of
62. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200 (1967).
63. See S. REP,. No. 617, supra note 60, at 1.
64. See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REv. 691, 701-
07 (1990) (detailing the expansive and devastating nature of these provisions).
65. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 60, at 1-2.
66. See Califa, supra note 5, at 811 (emphasis added) (noting statement rendered by Sen.
McClellan as reported in Organized Crime ControL Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1970)).
67. See Califa, supra note 5, at 811 (emphasis added) (noting statement rendered by Rep.
Poff as reported in Organized Crime Controk Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1970)).
68. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 60, at 1.
69. Califa, supra note 5, at 809.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See supra note 9.
71. Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protestors and the
Economic Motive Requirement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1341, 1350 (1990) (conceding, though not
asserting, the argument).
1994]
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a profit-generating component, such as extortion.72 Thus, it is prob-
able that Congress saw no need to insert an economic motive require-
ment into section 1961(1) or any other portion of the statute.73
Another reason the legislature failed to expressly include an eco-
nomic motive requirement in RICO was that otherwise, an unconsti-
tutional law would have resulted; one based on status.7 4 To avoid this
effect, Congress defined organized crime in terms of the activity,
rather than the identity, of its participants.75 This functional definition
had the inevitable effect of sweeping within its reach persons who
were not participants in organized crime, but who nonetheless were
involved in activities characteristic of that element.76 Senator Poff,
while acknowledging this result, stated that this effect was purely inci-
dental and inconsistent with Congress' original intent.77
RICO's opponents (and some supporters, most notably Senators
Edward M. Kennedy and Philip A. Hart) feared from the outset that
the OCCA might be used to quiet political protest.78 During Senate
hearings on the bill which proved to be the forerunner of the final
RICO bill,79 the American Civil Liberties Union (the ACLU) ex-
pressed concern over the sweeping reach given those provisions.8 0
Specifically, the ACLU noted that offenses of the type stemming from
anti-war demonstrations then taking place across the nation could sat-
isfy the bill's definition of "pattern of racketeering activity,"8" thereby
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Califa, supra note 5, at 813 n.49. Congress sought to avoid any express reference to
membership in the Mafia, since a status-oriented classification would have rendered RICO un-
constitutional. See, eg., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290,299 (1961). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,525 (1984) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[t]he legislative history reveals that Congress did not state explicitly
that the statute would reach only members of the Mafia because it believed there were constitu-
tional problems with establishing such a specific status offense"); 116 CONo. REc. 35,343-44
(1970) (statements of Reps. Celers and Poff).
75. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 90.
76. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 90. See also
116 CONG. REa 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("It is self-defeating to attempt to
exclude from any list of offenses such as that found in [T]itle IX all offenses which commonly are
committed by persons not involved in organized crime").
77. 116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970).
78. G. Robert Blakey, Perversion of Intent: The RICO Racket, NAT'L REV., May 16,1994, at
61-62.
79. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1969) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.§ 1961(1)(A)); 115 CONG. REc. 9569 (1969).
80. Gale, supra note 71, at 1361.
81. Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Measures Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 475 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
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resulting in the use of RICO's crushing sanctions against political
protestors.
Though the ACLU focused its argument on the potential misuse
of section 1962(a) against such demonstrators, the argument was im-
plicitly, if not equally, applicable to section 1962(c).' In articulating
its fear that RICO's broad language might lend itself to prosecution of
political protestors, the ACLU nevertheless noted that "[ilt is clear
that this proposed legislation is in no way intended to subject [such
persons] to the penalties described. ' 3 This statement, rendered by an
independent legal services organization actively involved in the bill's
legislative process, serves as contemporaneous evidence that Congress
never intended RICO to be employed against persons engaged in ide-
ological protest.
The proposition that an economic motive requirement inheres in
RICO's provisions generally, and in section 1962(c) specifically, is
strengthened by the Justice Department's objection to the initial defi-
nition given "racketeering activity" as "too broad."" At the time, the
bill defined such activity as "any act involving the danger of violence
to life, limb or property, indictable under State or Federal law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 5 The Justice
Department claimed that such breadth "would result in a large
number of unintended applications."86
As a result of these objections, the Senate subcommittee altered
the definition of "racketeering activity" to include various specific
crimes cognizable under state lawY The subcommittee's response is
indicative of congressional intent to limit RICO's application and sug-
gests that efforts by the judiciary to expand the statute's reach, by
refusing to require an economic motive, are misguided.
It is quite likely that Congress acquiesced in RICO's breadth in
exchange for a statute which would provide the means to aggressively
confront the problems posed by organized crime; problems which had,
until that time, remained unsolvable.88 Such a compromise is perhaps
one reason for congressional failure to expressly include an economic
motive requirement in Title X. Another possible explanation for this
82. Gale, supra note 71, at 1361. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 81, at 475-76.
83. Senate Hearings, supra note 81, at 476.
84. Gale, supra note 71, at 1361.
85. S. 1861, supra note 79.
86. Gale, supra note 71, at 1361.
87. Senate Hearings, supra note 81, at 405. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
88. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 60, at 1021.
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void is that many members wanted a crime fighting statute in effect
before the upcoming November 1970 elections and end of the con-
gressional session, and thus felt that an overly-broad RICO was pref-
erable to none at all.89
Perhaps the most damning condemnation of the Scheidler ruling,
and RICO's use against political protestors, comes from the statute's
principal drafter himself, Professor G. Robert Blakey of the Notre
Dame School of Law.' Professor Blakey has noted that RICO was
not intended to have any application "beyond the marketplace of
commercial transactions." 91 Referring to Scheidler (in which, not co-
incidentally, he served as defense counsel to Joseph Scheidler), 92 he
has stated that "[u]ntil the applicability of RICO to demonstra[tors] is
definitively rejected, [this] success.., in the Supreme Court will chill
political and social protest of all types. Such a weapon of terror
against First Amendment freedoms was not what I was told to design
when I was counsel to Senator McClellan . ... "93
As support for his interpretation of RICO, Professor Blakey
points out that "[n]o offense relating to trespass or vandalism in the
context of protests was included in the final version of RICO. ' 94 Fur-
ther, he notes that the offenses of "riot" and "coercion" were ruled
out as RICO predicate acts (those acts which may form a pattern of
racketeering for purposes of RICO prosecution) in order "to preclude
any possibility that RICO might be used against demonstrators." 95 As
Professor Blakey has remarked, "A world of legal difference exists
between a Vito Corleone . . . and [those engaged in political
protest]. 96
It is clear from the above that RICO was originally intended to
reach only those who, out of a desire for pecuniary gain, undertake
criminal activity. In the words of Senator McClellan, "Unless an indi-
vidual not only commits... a crime but engages in a pattern of such
violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in...
89. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 60, at 1021.
90. See generally Gregory J. Wallance, Outgunning the Mob, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 60-61
(discussing Professor Blakey's association with RICO and the statute's development as a tool
with which to confront organized crime).
91. Blakey, supra note 78, at 62.
92. Blakey, supra note 78, at 61.
93. Blakey, supra note 78, at 76.
94. Blakey, supra note 78, at 62.
95. Blakey, supra note 78, at 62.
96. Blakey, supra note 78, at 62.
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business, he is not made subject to proceedings under title IX."97 Re-
ferring to civil RICO, the Supreme Court itself has noted that "[it] is
evolving into something quite different from the original conception
of its enactors. 98
III. SCHEIDLER'S EFFECT ON SOCIAL PROTEST
A. Protected Expression: Free Speech
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Scheidler, the question
remains: How much of the cost to control that small portion of polit-
ical protest which turns violent will be borne by First Amendment
freedoms? Although several amici and the respondents raised the is-
sue before the Supreme Court, it was held that, since respondents
failed to do so in the Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of the
statute as it applied to the instant circumstances would be the only
treatment given that question.99
Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, 1°° did address the issue
and opined that those who fear RICO's use in suppression of free
speech need not worry. He stated that "an economic-motive require-
ment would protect too much with respect to First Amendment inter-
ests, since it would keep RICO from reaching ideological entities
whose members commit acts of violence we need not fear chilling."' 01
The concurrence further reasoned that such a requirement was unnec-
essary because legitimate free speech claims could be raised and ad-
dressed in individual cases as they are brought before the court."°
This logic fails to acknowledge that a vast number of persons en-
gaged in ideological protest, or desiring to affiliate themselves with an
organization doing so, will now be deterred from legitimate, protected
expression due to fear of being labeled a "racketeer" and subjected to
prosecution under RICO. The stigma attached to such a charge, not
to mention the financial burden associated with its defense, are not
lessened by the opportunity to claim the First Amendment as a de-
fense once the action has gone to trial.103 Furthermore, "[m]any a
97. 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (emphasis added) (supporting a requirement of economic
motive for proceedings under section 1962(a), as well as, by implication, subsections (b) and (c)).
98. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1984).
99. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 n.6 (1994).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 807.
102. Id.
103. Professor Melissa Harrison, herself a former federal prosecutor, notes that "First
Amendment defenses to RICO actions.., are generally unsuccessful." Marcia Coyle, Clinics
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prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even
a case with no merit .... ,14 Ultimately, the Supreme Court's ruling
has the potential for devastating results and may very well change the
face of advocacy as many Americans have come to know and cherish.
The First Amendment protects the freedom of persons to petition
and to assemble.' 05 Many historians and legal scholars maintain that
its provisions were of unsurpassed importance in the minds of the
drafters of the Constitution. 6 Because of this emphasis placed upon
free expression, political protest has become ingrained in the nation's
consciousness as the method by which social reform is affected.' 0 7
The necessity of expressive civil liberties in a pluralistic, demo-
cratic society has led the courts to formulate the doctrine of chilling
effect, an approach whereby all other legal concerns are generally
subordinated to those of free speech. 08 The doctrine of chilling effect
is predicated upon the legal system's belief that any harm occasioned
by limiting free speech is comparatively greater than that which re-
sults from limiting other activities. 109 This philosophy dictates that
legal rules should be constructed in a manner that places the greater
risk of legal error upon those activities competing with speech,
thereby minimizing any such risk to protected expression. 10 In grant-
ing abortion providers such a daunting weapon so easily employed,"'
Win One: Justices Accept RICO Use Against Protestors; Free Speech Challenge Lies Ahead,
NAT'L W., Feb. 7, 1994, at 37.
104. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that "[C]ivil RICO has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils it was
designed to combat").
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech .... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). A thorough treat-
ment of First Amendment issues as they relate to political protest, in general, and antiabortion
protest, in particular, is obviously beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, only those basic
concerns regarding RICO's implications for civil liberties are discussed.
106. Califa, supra note 5, at 832.
107. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985) (discussing the role that
political protest, in general, and civil disobedience, in particular, play in American political life).
108. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling
Effect," 58 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978).
109. Califa, supra note 5, at 833.
110. Schauer, supra note 108, at 705.
111. Mr. Califa writes:
Facile pleading requirements readily subject an organization or individuals, with little
relation to the predicate acts or enterprise, to the threat of [RICO] .... [T]he suit
often accomplishes the objective of threatening an ideological opponent .... Indeed,
plaintiffs intolerant of a group's opinions may file suit, realizing that their allegations
will be very difficult to prove, with the sole intention of inhibiting the activities that
they consider to be an imposition:
Califa, supra note 5, at 834-35.
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and thus subject to abuse," 2 the Court has ignored this system of hier-
archy devised to protect our most sacred of liberties. Instead, it has
chosen to grant property rights 1 3 a preference over what is the cor-
nerstone of our society, those civil liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
Various commentators favoring the statute's use as a means of
addressing the more questionable aspects of clinic protest invariably
caution those who would employ it to avoid its wrongful use in sup-
pression of First Amendment freedoms." 4 In fact, this concern was
reflected in Justice Souter's own admonition to the federal courts." 5
This solicitude is a sobering admission of the potential for damage
RICO poses to protected expression - picketing,1 6  coercive
speech 17 and even offensive speech 1 ' - from those who are its
strongest proponents in the abortion-rights context.
B. Unprotected Expression: Civil Disobedience
No one could reasonably contend that protestor activities which
go beyond true expression, such as forceful entry" 9 and obstruction of
access, 20 should go unpunished. However, it is reasonable to suggest
that RICO and its "big gun" approach are not the answer to such
112. Califa, supra note 5, at 836 n.162 (noting that FED. R. Civ. P., which dictates that attor-
neys submit only those pleadings which they, in good faith, believe to be true, is an inadequate
safeguard to protect those civil liberties placed at risk by RICO).
113. Bruce Ledewitz, RICO's Latest Vctim-Social Protest, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1994, at A19.
114. Attorneys Henn and Del Monaco write: "[W]omen and clinics who sue under this stat-
ute should nevertheless be careful to avoid infringing upon first amendment rights." Henn &
Del Monaco, supra note 6, at 275-76. The author would like to know the likelihood that ordi-
nary citizens and clinic operators will be familiar with the various theories underlying proper
application of the First Amendment, and correspondingly, when a claim under RICO, in consid-
eration of those theories, is properly asserted? Answer. doubtfully ever (most are aware that
many attorneys will bring forth almost any suit, especially one capable of yielding treble dam-
ages, under the elastic provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 11). See also Gale, supra note 71, at 1370
(admitting that "[t]he First Amendment may nevertheless preclude the use of RICO against
antiabortion protestors").
115. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 807 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "I
think it prudent to notice that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy and to caution the
courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interest that could be at stake").
116. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
117. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
118. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
119. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (finding liability of defendants who entered clinic's facilities without
permission).
120. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (holding that picketing which ob-
structs access may properly be prohibited by law).
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minor offenses. Nor are they the answer to protest which turns vio-
lent.12 There are, and have always been, adequate state and federal
laws to address such lawlessness."22
While any violation of the law should carry an appropriate sanc-
tion, some forms of peaceful violation are necessary in order to dra-
matically call attention to a cause.123 Admittedly, such behavior is not
protected expression. 24 At best, it is a mixture of both protected
speech and unprotected conduct.12 Such behavior is nevertheless an
effective tactic that has been used by political protestors for de-
cades. 2 6 Under threat of RICO prosecution, the costs associated with
such methods will become too high for all but the most ardent keeper
of the faith to bear. Scheidler, in effect, is a direct affront to the role
that civil disobedience has played in developing the social and legal
structure of this nation.' 27
Civil disobedience, defined as predominantly nonviolent, open
and illegal conduct designed to attract the attention of the commu-
nity,128 is often the last resort for those whom society will not accom-
modate. The protestor engaged in civil disobedience and society
"differ radically over the legitimacy of the alleged right at stake.1 29
Pro-choice advocates view this right as one to choose termination of a
pregnancy; as a woman's right to personal autonomy. In contrast, an-
tiabortion activists do not see the existence of any right whatsoever.
They view the "right" to abortion as simply legalized homicide and
resort to what is believed to be a higher law in their attempts to com-
bat its exercise. 30
121. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (holding that "[t]he First
Amendment does not protect violence [in protest]").
122. Professor Ledewitz commented: "RICO was never needed to combat truly violent pro-
test. Murder, assault and arson already carry severe state and federal penalties. RICO lawsuits
will not be aimed at them. Rather, they will be aimed at illegal but essentially peaceful protest."
Ledewitz, supra note 113, at A17 (referring to traditional types of civil disobedience). See also
Gale, supra note 71, at 1343 (noting that federal authorities are often unresponsive in the prose-
cution of violent clinic protestors).
123. Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HO-SrRA
L. REV. 67, 70-71 (1990).
124. Id. at 67.
125. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); United States v. O'Brien, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
126. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 68.
127. See generally Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation to Obey, 18 GA. L. REv.
891 (1984); Roll Sartorius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L. Ruv. 3 (1981).
128. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 70-71.
129. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 87.
130. See Rice, supra note 8, at 16-18 (noting antiabortion activists' claimed resort to the
common law and statutory doctrines of justification and necessity in furtherance of divine will).
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Regardless of the position one takes on the abortion-rights issue
in general, civil disobedience on the part of pro-life demonstrators
serves as a necessary outlet for the frustration felt by a great number
of persons who believe the current abortion laws are immoral. The
interest of the activists' victim, the abortion provider, is purely com-
mercial.131 Accordingly, remedies are available for those economic
injuries suffered.132 With this in mind, the "right to do business unim-
peded is not sufficiently vital to risk the loss of the rich political tradi-
tion of civil disobedience."' 33 Allowing clinics to bring suits against
antiabortion activists under RICO will risk such a loss.
Civil disobedience becomes more difficult to justify when it be-
gins to interfere with the rights of another; specifically, a woman's
constitutional right to obtain an abortion. This is, of course, the criti-
cism leveled at many pro-life activist organizations." 4 However, civil
disobedience which threatens individual rights does not, nor do its ad-
vocates suggest that it should, enjoy full constitutional protection. 35
As indeed its practitioners intend, civil disobedience inevitably leads
to arrest. 136 Thus, while antiabortion advocacy may render a woman's
attempt to obtain an abortion more difficult, it does not deny her the
ultimate exercise of that right. 3 7
As applied to illegal, though nonviolent, political protests, RICO
ignores the existence of laws capable of addressing the problems
posed by such conduct. Further, it threatens to undermine civil diso-
bedience; a practice that has produced some of the most sweeping re-
form in our nation's history. RICO's use against antiabortion
protestors is simply not warranted by the minimal threat these groups
pose to the free exercise of abortion rights.
131. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 87.
132. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1347-48 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life,
Inc., 859 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1988).
133. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 87-88.
134. See Tamar Lewin, With Thin Staff and Thick Debt Anti-Abortion Group Faces Struggle,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1990, at A16 (reporting statement of Kate Michelman, Executive Director
of the National Abortion Rights Action League, who claims that "Operation Rescue violate[s]
the civil rights of women .... ).
135. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 89.
136. Due to the presence of various media covering such events, antiabortion demonstrators
often welcome arrest as a method by which to publicize their campaign. These arrests create a
nuisance for the criminal justice system, making their protests more burdensome. See, e.g., Henn
& Del Monaco, supra note 6, at 259-60.
137. Ledewitz, supra note 123, at 89.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has given its approval to RICO's use in civil
prosecution of pro-life demonstrators. Scheidler is likely a response to
the increasingly hostile confrontations between abortion rights advo-
cates and those who oppose them. Regardless, that ruling is in direct
disregard of the legislative history attendant to Title IX of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act and one which threatens to overwhelm the
convictions of those who believe strongly in unconventional
ideologies.
It is important to note that RICO lends itself only to the prosecu-
tion of acts that are already criminalized.13 8 The statute's legislative
history clearly indicates its intended use as one against organized
crime, not social protest. Statements made and documents generated
pursuant to RICO's enactment are replete with evidence of an intent
only to confront those potential defendants motivated by economic
concerns.
It is contrary to both congressional intent and the Constitution to
allow RICO to be employed against demonstrators. Though the con-
text of Scheidler is one of antiabortion protest, a far-reaching and dan-
gerous precedent has been set. The threat of treble damages and the
stigma attached to being labeled a racketeer will deter all but the most
hardy of advocates. Inevitable is a chilling of free speech and deter-
rence of civil disobedience, two forms of expression which are crucial
to the maintenance of our societal fabric.
Joel A. Youngblood
138. Gale, supra note 71, at 1372.
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